Revue Se’nkgalaise des Recherches Agricoles et...
Revue Se’nkgalaise des Recherches Agricoles et Halieutiques - Vol. 4 - n 0 1,1992
PELAGIC FISHERIES OF SENEGAL : MANAGEMENT OPTIONS,
POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF SUBSIDIES *
M. DEME
ISRA researcher
Department of fisheries research
ABSTRACT
After a global presentation of the Senegalese pelagic fishery, the identification as well
as the location and the distribution of the fish stocks, this article analyses the effects of
financial support programs in the industry. The suitability of some classical regulatory
policies to manage small scale fishery of Senegal is discussed and constraints which fishe-
ry managers may be confronted when implementing such measures are identified.
Special consideration is given to subsidies as a management tool for the fishery.
Key words : Fishcrics, Management, Senegal, Small pelagics, Subsidies.
Preparation of this article was supported by the International
l
Center for Ocean Development
(ICOD) while in training in Canada. The paper has benefited from constructive critiques and sug-
gestions from Birane SAMB, Jean-Jacques LEVENEZ. and Moustapha KEBE (CRODT),
Anthony CHARLES (Saint Mary’s University), Helene TREMBLAY and James WILSON (Groupe
d’Etudes des Ressources Maritimes, UQAR), Jon SUTINEN (University of Rhode Islmd, USA).
LES PECHERIES PELAGIQUES DU SENEGAL :
OPTIONS DE GESTION,
CONTRAINTES POLITIQUES ET ROLE DES SUBVENTIONS
M. DEME
Chercheur de LI~RA
Direcrion des Recherches sur les Productions ilalieutiques
RESUME
Après une présentation g6nérale dc la pkhcrie des petits pélagiques côtiers au
SénCgal, ce document analyse les impacts macro-économiques de quelques politiques
sectorielles d’accompagnement dc I’industric. L’application dc certaines techniques
classiques d’aménagement a cette ptkherie est discutk et les contraintes potentielles sont
identifiks. L’assistancc financikrc comme instrument de gestion des pêcheries est
explorée.
Mots-clés : Pkhcries, Aménagement, StWgal, Petits pélagiques côtiers,
Subventions.
105
INTRODUCTION
Senegalese fishery benefits from some exceptional natural factors like a sea rich in
fish, a climate characterized by sub-tropical upwelling conditions and a coastal zone
extending over 700 kilometres.
Fishery is a vital sector in Senegal. It was the second most important activity after
agriculture in the country’s economy. Currently it is becoming predominant due to the
persistent drought hurting the agricultural sector since the late 1970’s. The value of fish
and fish products, estimated at US $ 100 million, exceeded the value of the agricultural
products in both- 1980 and 1981 (11). Fishery is a source of currency which contributes
significantly to the improvement of the balance of payments and to the financing of
public investments. This activity is the primary source of animal protein, urban as well
as rural. The average per capita consumption of fish exceeds 20 kilograms in some areas
of the country. Fishery contrtbutes greatly to employment in the country by providing
jobs to 35 000 fishermen - not including the many people involved in processing,
distribution and retailing, boat building and net making. This massive fisheries base
helps to stabilize rural populations along the coast line. On the whole, fishery comprises
about 10 percent of the Senegalese work force (10).
State authorities having realised the importance of fishery in the Senegalese
economy, instituted several dcvclopmcnt projects As pointed out by many fishery eco-
nomists (24), this development program should be supported by studies of the effects of
such investments on the fish stocks, long-term fish production, national employment,
local income, and foreign cxchangc.
This paper focuses on the pelagic fishery due to its long term importance in Sene-
galese landings and some indications of over exploitation in some areas of the country
due to increasing fishing effort.
After providing a description of the Senegalese pelagic fishery, the identification as
well as the location and the distribution of the fish stocks, effects of financial support
programs in the industry are analysed. The suitability of some classical regulatory
policies to manage small scale fishery of Senegal is discussed and constraints which
fishery managers may be confronted when implementing such measures are identified
Special consideration is given to subsidies as a management tool for fishery.
FISHERY RESOURCES
Major small pelagic fish landed are round sardinella (Sardinelfa aurikz), flat sardinella
(Sardinella maderensis), and bonga (Elhmalosa jimbriata). These three species account
for more than 63 percent of the pelagic catches in 1988 and are characterized by their
high abundance that makes their economic exploitation possible.
Sardinelfa aurila. is found in the cooler water upwelling areas. The species has two
spawning peaks occuring in May-June and September-November (16). The age of first
maturity of Sardinelfa aurifa is on average 18 centimeters (5). The individuals born in
the Senegalcse waters will stay there until they reach a size of 25 centimeters on average
and start their migration cycle which would take them back only during the cold season
(14): As a result, adults are present in the Senegalese waters for no more than 6 months
during the -year.
106
Surdinellu muderensis is found in areas of upwellings and warm waters with low
salinity such as estuaries and river mouths. Reproduction of this species takes place from
April to November, with the period of spawning varying from year to year (20). The age
of first maturity of Surdinellu muderensis is estimated at 16 centimeters (5). Two nursery
areas occur in the Mauritania-Senegalese area coinciding with those of Surdinella uuritu.
Ethmulosu jGnbriutu or bonga occurs in shallow waters, lagoons, estuaries, and near
river mouths. This species is characterized by its coastal distribution. Migration of Ethmczlosu
fimbriutu is very limited compared to Surdinellu uuritu. In Senegal, spawning peaks occur
from March to July, and from October to November (22).
Data collected from acoustic surveys show there to, be a potential of 60 to 70 000
tons of small pelagic fish available in the C&e Nerd of Senegal (2) while FREON (16)
es&mated 110 000 tons of Surdinellu spp in the Petite C&e region in the most favourable
upwelling conditions. Polish seiners catches and results from acoustic surveys indicate a
potential of 80 to 90 000 tons of small pelagic in the Cusumunce area (2) (Pig. 1).
Figure 1 : Fishing regions of Senegal
S E N E G A L
107
HARVESTING SECTOR
Small pelagic fish are subject to both small-scale and semi- industrial exploitation.
Each of these sectors have had its own distinct evolution and impact on the fisheries of
Senegal and on the small pelagic fisheries in particular. These sectors are compared in
several respects below.
ARTISANAL FISHERY
The purse seine is by far the most widely used gear in the small-scale fishery. The
artisanal purse seine unit consists of two outboard powered pirogues, about 14 to 20 meters
in length with a load capacity ranging from 16 to 25 metric tons and a crew size of 20
people on average The net has a length ranging from 300 to 400 meters.
The surrounding gillnct, which is used less intensively in small-scale fishery, is on
average operated by a 7-man crew using a 14 meter motorized canoe. The bigger
meshed nets capture Ethmalosa fimbriafa, while the smaller meshed nets are directed
mainly toward the capture of Sardinella maderensis.
Since being introduced by FA0 in 1972, the number of artisanal purse seines has
increased sharply over the years. The April 1988 CRODT census counted 324 operational
nets along the Senegalese coasts. At the same time 140 surrounding gillnets were coun-
ted. The economic importance of this gear has decreased with the introduction of the
purse seine, which is more productive and more efficient in the fishery.
The total artisanal fishing catch estimated at 231 272 metric tons in 1987 increased
to 236 966 tons in 1988. Pelagic fish accounted for the major part of the catch in both
years totalling about 186 046 and 194 430 metric tons respectively in 1987 and 1988
(tabl. 1).
Fishing trips in artisanal tishcry. last a day, and usually less than ten hours due to
the small carrying capacity and the mode of fish preservation. Small-scale fishery has
experienced an unprecedented increase of its fishing effort in Mbour and Joal, the two
major fishing grounds of the country (tabl. 2).
The catch per unit of effort (CPUE) of artisanal fishing units showed a decrease since
1978 and had remarkably improved in 1988 by reaching its highest level for the last ten
years. In fact, the artisanal purse seine CPUE was 4.06 tons/fishing trip in Joal while the
surrounding gillnet registered 1.80 tons/ fishing trip (tabl. 3).
SEMI-INDUSTRIAL FISHERY
The semi-industrial purse seine fishery operates with vessels up 32 meters in length
with carrying capacities ranging from 13 to 120 tjb and equipped with engines varying
between 110 and 600 horsepower, a power-block and various electronic equipment. Unlike
the artisanal sector, the catches of the semi- industrial fleet are preserved with ice chilled
sea water before being landed ashore for processing.
The number of semi-industrial seiners was limited to one vessel until 1966. A record
of 19 units was reached in both 1974 and 1982. In 1988 only 5 vessels are operating follo-
wing the crisis resulting from poor managcmeht, difficulties of access to formal credit and
the sharp decreases in both landings and prices that the fishery is experiencing.
108
Table no 1 : Total landings of the artisanal fishery (tons)
Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Species
\\
-
-
Pelagic fish
107 940
125 565
120 365
122 065
150984
186046
194 430
Demersal fish
22 835
30 042
36 736
37 880
40 777
34 149
32 576
Shrimps
1279
‘1 184
598
946
1741
2 131*
1 984
Gasteropod
7901
6 372
3 886
5 818
5600
6 846
4 619
Miscellaneous
1951
2 052
1 806
1 559
2 033
2 100
3 357
Total
141 906 165 215
163 391
168 268
201135 231272
236 966
Table no 2 : Fishing trips for artisanal units in Mbour and Joal
MBOUR
JOAL
Year
Purse. Seine
Surrounding
Purse Seine
. Surrounding
Gillnet
Gillnet
1978
5 141
837
2 940
3 371
1979
8 455
260
3 798
7 136
1980
6 283
383
4 316
5 448
1981
8 377
911
5 665
6 650
1982
7 838
817
7 683
9048
1983
10 796
2 933
8 253
11 552
1984
9 702
3 766
9 087
16 215
1985
8 376
4 884
9 505
19 929
1986
11 960
1 595
10 208
17 702
1987
9 375
2 026
10 684
19 569
1988
13 529
1 844
11816
18 117
109
Table no 3 : CPUE for artisanal fishing units in Mbour and Joal (tons)
MBOUR
JOAL
Year
Surrounding
Surrounding
Purse Seine
Gillnet
Purse Seine
Gillnet
___-. --.--
---__--
__--
1978
2.85
I .03
2.72
1.09
1979
2.36
0.78
2.41
1.17
1980
2.33
0.72
2.63
0.74
1981
2.35
0.70
2.85
0.74
1982
2.44
0.78
2.70
0.98
1983
3.18
0.99
2.64
0.99
1984
2.34
0.84
2.14
1.09
1985
3.14
0.83
2.44
1.03
1986
3.70
1.10
2.57
1.21
1987
3.66
1.05
3.82
1.60
1988
3.40
1.11
4.06
1.80
The annual landings of semi-industrial seiners increased from 2 000 tons at the
beginning of the activity (4) to a record of 33 908 tons of fish in 1974. Landings have
decreased since, and in 1988 only 4199 tons were landed.
Fishing effort of the semi-industial fishery increased up to 1982 when it reached
32 720 sea hours and then dccreascd to only 7520 hours in 1988.
Semi-industrial Ilcct catch per unit of effort, very high at the beginning of the fishery
(15 tons/l0 hours), has dccrcascd remarkably and is oscillating around only 6 tons in 1988.
This seems to bc the result of the concentrated effort of semi-industrial and artisanal
seiners confined on the fishing grounds near Dakar, which are heavily exploited. Also the
semi-industrial vcsscls which arc very old and poorly managed are suffering from compe-
tition of artisanal units which have lower operating costs and special financial assistance
from the state authorities. These two factors enable artisanal vessels to sell their catch
at a lower price.
Table 4 summarises the historical data of -semi-industrial fishery.
There must added 4 Gambian sciners which have caught 5 539 tons of fish in the
Sencgambian waters bctwccn Novcmbcr 1987 and the end of 1988, accounting for 85
fishing trips (21).
Ships operated by AFRICAN SEA FOOD are not considered in this paper, since they
started their activities in 1989 only.
110
Table no 4 : Evolution of the semi-industrial fishery
Year
Number
Landings (Tons) Fi~~~~o~s~t
CPUE
(Tons/l0 Hours)
1978
10
20 507
1 777
12
1979
15
25 025
2 215
11
1980
18
27 508
2 634
10
1981
15
31 362
2 900
11
1982
19
24 884
3 272
8
1983
17
17 981
3 065
6
1984
13
6 990
1478
5
1985
9
5 982
1 086
6
1986
5
3 145
684
5
1987
5
4 805
662
7
1988
5
4 199
752
6
FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAMS AND FISHERY SUBSIDIES
The Senegalcsc government, rcalizing the importance of fishery as a major source
of animal protein, income, and employment, instituted several development projects. The
most important are the motorisation of pirogues and the introduction of the purse seine
gear in the small-scale fishcry. These two major projects benefit from financial support
programs. Outboard motors, fishing gear, and spare parts are sold to fishermen duty and
tax free, and gasoline includes a subsidy clement which is about 51 percent of the total
price. These financial support programs have without doubt contributed to the deve-
lopment of small-scale pelagic fishcry just as they have also gcncratcd adverse effects in
the industry.
POSITIVJX IMPACTS OF CURRENT POLICY
Financial support programs have contributed to the profitability of the Scnegalesc pelagic
fishcry by providing a less costly fishing method to the small-scale fishermen exploiting
the pelagic fish stocks. As a result, production has increased remarkably following Ihe
extensive expansion of fishcry. The unprccedcntcd incrcasc in landings led to the rapid
development of both local and export fresh fish markets and the artisanal fish smoking
industry. The creation of new jobs, the stabilization of rural populations along the coastline
and the improvcmcnt of the quality of the fish landed arc other successes linked to the
assistance programs for the small-scale fishcry. With the wide adoption of outboard motors,
111
motorization is “likely remaining a permanent feature of the artisanal fishery of Senegal”
(19). However, the decrease in the profitability of the artisanal purse seine which is ap-
parently related to overfishing resulting from excess fishing effort, especially in the Petite
C6te region, seems to indicate that assistance programs have passed their limits.
PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION
Export-Orientation
One of the major objectives of the state authorities, by providing assistance to small-
scale fishermen, is to improve the nutritional standard of the Senegalese population
through a sufficicnt’supply of fish in the home market at a fair price. However, the small-
scale fishcry is presently an industry well intcgratcd into the economic activity of the country
and contributes more than 40 pcrccnt of the supply of the processing plants for exports
in 1981 (8). The orientation of the artisanal fishery towards the foreign markets coupled
with the available export subsidies (15 percent of the FOB value of exports) make one
wonder who benefits most from the financial assistance to the fishery, outside of local
processors and the foreign consumers. As an illustration, in 1981 the subsidy per kilogram
of fish landed at Djifere, cstimatcd at 22 FCFA trebled the price paid to fishermen by
the processing company Sopcsinc.
Trough 1982, this company converted, on a yearly basis, nearly 20 000 tons of
sardinellas and bongas to fish meal for the international market Cl5, 6) while at the same
time there is a severe shortage of animal protein in most rural areas of the Senegal.
Poor Distribution and Marketing
Financial assistance to fishery is mainly concentrated on production leading to an
increased harvesting capacity of fishcrmcn, but the existing market distortions and their
costs arc often neglected. The incfficicnt distribution system of fish in Senegal is partially
caused by the precarious transportation facilities of fish traders and the insufficiency. of
fish marketing infrastructure facilities in the main markets and landing sites. The inadequate
transportation syslcm coupled with the long distances involved lead to high marketing
costs, due principally to fuel and refrigeration costs. Part of these costs are then passed
on by middlemen as increases in consumer prices. As an illustration, in 1985 fishermen
received on average 29 F CFA per kilogram of sardineila in the Petile C&e. This fish
was then sold for 300 FCFA at Tambacounda, some few hundred kilometers away from
the coast.
This is not to argue that subsidies and direct fiscal inccntivcs for fishermen should
cease but rather that some subsidies could bc redirected in order to improve the marketing
and distribution network, and thereby increase the welfare of fishermen and domestic
consumers. As the fishery has undergone a rapid growth since the introduction of the purse
seine and the motorization of canoes, an improvement in the efficiency of marketing
should be given priority in any development plan. Refrigerated trucks and cold storage
facilities could be sold to fish traders through a governmental tax exemption program.
Excess Fishing Effort
Subsidies and tax exemption contribute to decrease the cost of fishing. In turn, lower
costs bring mom effort into fishcry. The excess effort could push the fish population
I12
down to such an extent that sustainable yield would fall, as would the revenues of fishermen
due to the decrease in sustainable yield (assuming a constant price). Any profit produced
by lower costs encourages further entry in theopen-access fishery until that profit is dissipated’.
Depending upon the ratio of price to cost, a decrease in cost offered by financial support
programs will not help fishermen under open-access conditions in the long run. In fact,
it may lead to a decrease in catch due to excessive effort from existing boats expanding
their fishing capacity and from new fishing units entering the industry attracted by the
short-run profits provided by the financial assistance programs. For example, in the Ivory
Coast,.as reported by LAWSON and ROBINSON (18), fishery underwent an unprece-
dented expansion following the introduction of a soft loan scheme in 1980, leading to the
proliferation of the purse seine gears. The high resulting pressure put on the fishery resulted
quickly in a decrease of both catch rates and fishermen’s incomes. Defaults on loans and
the potential extinction of the fish stock pushed fishermen, fishing department authorities
and the lending banks to agree to close the fishery temporarily. As a further example,
the policy of industrialisation in Norway through state subsidies as pointed out by
JENTOFF and MIKALSEN (17) “did more IO produce overcupaciry and resource depletion
than to generate profitability and efficiency”.
CLASSICAL MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND SMALL PELAGIC FISHERIES
The level of catches in the Petite c6te in 1986 was higher than the potential which
is estimated at 110 000 tons.. And in 1987 and 1988 landings have increased again. Given
the structure of Senegal’s small pelagic fishcry, as discussed above, and indications that
the existing and generally increasing fishing effort has caused biological as well as econo-
mica1 overfishing in some arcas of the country, what rclcvance do classical management
approaches have for this fishery. Should managemcm policies accompany the deve-
lopment program in the open-access fishcry, in order to realise the added profit ? Are
classical regulatory policies applicable to the small-scale fishery ?
As pointed out by many fishcry cconomists(7, 23) the choice among ‘alternative
management policies should be based on a set of criteria which includes: acceptance and
support of the majority of fishermen conccrncd, flexibility, full accounting of the involved
costs, wealth distribution, and employment implications. This chapter discusses the suita-
bility of some of the classical measures to manage the small pelagic lishery of Senegal.
QUOTAS
With a global quota the regulatory agency decides on the total amount of fish to be
caught during a given period and closes down the fishery when that amount is reached.
A quota system has a positive cffcct on the conservation of the fish stock through
direct control of the fishing mortality. No equity considerations arc present because of
’ It is not the purpose of this paper to argue the important efficiency implications of rent dissipation.
We are merely pointing out that if it is the objective of the public to retain resource rents in the
public domain or in the hands of a limited number of fishermen. then this policy will not achieve
that objective.
113
the absence of direct allocation. Enforcement costs are relatively low and it is easy to
monitor the fishery once it is closed. There is no incentive for fishermen to fill the global
quota with the most valuable species, reducing the risk to extinction as may be the case
in a multispecies fishery because small pclagics are close substitutes and low value fish,
and each gear directs its effort mainly to a specific species. However, due to the nature
of the Senegalese small-scale fishery a quota system would be impractical. Fishing units
numbering in the hundreds are highly mobile and widely distributed over 700 kilometers
of coastlines and often in remote and highly inaccessible areas.
Monitoring catches would be too costly and technically impossible if individual
quotas were implemented. In addition to the allocation problem that may emerge, the regula-
tory agency may face two mutually exclusive objectives consisting of encouraging
efficiency in the fishery and keeping in the industry the poor fishermen *ho have no
means to compete for quotas in the market (12, 13).
GEAR RESTRICTIONS
The best known and most widely used gear restriction is the adjustment of the mesh
size of the different active gears in the fishery. This type of regulation prevents the
destruction of the fishery by maintaining a productive age structure of the stock. Young
fish allowed to grow larger can reproduce and hence contribute to the biomass of the
fish stock before being caught.
This management policy is already implemented in the Senegalese pelagic fishery.
Its non-distributional form of regulation makes it politically and socially acceptable.
Enforcement costs can be very low when meshes are standardixed. The economic perfor-
mance of this type of regulation is howcvcr suboptimal because resulting increases in
stocks gcncratc bcttcr short-term catches and more profit to fishermen, thus attracting
new fishing units in the industry until dissipation of the generated rent results. As ob-
served in Scncgal, fishcrmcn in the long run easily by-pass such restrictions by re-
placing the nets with larger ones during the repair and maintenance process. Gear res-
trictions, as dcmonstratcd by many fishery economists, raise the average cost of fishing
and leave the open-access problem unsolved.
TAXATION
This regulatory policy aims to control fishing effort by taking away the rent which
motivates fishermen to over-invest in fishing equipment or attracts new fishing units in
the industry. The capability of taxes to conscrvc the fish stock is high since the management
authority can influence effort or the amount of fish landed.
Furthermore, taxes can bc used to channel fishing effort towards the less heavily
fished stocks. However, as already mentioned, the nature of the Senegalese fishery (mobile
fishing units, multi-species, hetcrogcncity of gears, over 125 landing sites) makes moni-
toring and enforcing taxing regulation very expensive. In most developing countries like
Senegal, taxing artisanal fishermen, who are among the least favoured in the community.
and who barely earn subsistence incomes is politically and socially infeasible. As men-
tioned by BEDDINGTON and RETTIG(3) taxes would have to rise if they are to reduce
effort as stocks decline. However, for political and social reasons, it would be quite difficult
to increase artisanal fishermen’s taxes at exactly the same time that their expected catch
114
has been reduced. Unlike the artisanal fishery, the semi-industrial fishermen are subject
to payment of port taxes and landing charges. However, this taxation scheme does not
attempt to control fishing effort but is only a way to increase state revenues,
LICENSING
This regulation restricts directly the number of units operating in the fishery, resulting
in a probable improvement of both the yield and economic performance of the fishery.
But how is one to distribute the licences ? If auctioned or sold in the market, most artisanal
fishermen, who barely earn a subsistence income and who have no access to formal credit,
would be driven out of the fishery. The lack of ahcrnalivc employment outside the fishery
makes exiting from the fishery very difficult. Some political and social constraints are then
present when implementing any licensing scheme involving the withdrawal of .some
fishermen from the industry when other sectors of the economy are suffering from chronic
unemployment. In the worst cast licences can bc granted to fishermen who are already
in the fishery for some equity considerations, This would remove the open-access nature
of the fishery but would not reduce the amount of effort deployed on the fish stocks.
ANDERSON (1) proposes to make each license non-transferable and to retract it as the
holder retires or dies until the proper number remains outstanding. But do small-scale
fishermen actually retire? Is it socially fcasiblc to retract a license from a fishing- dependant
household after the head member holder of the fishing license dies (9) ?
At present, industrial fishermen arc licensed. This policy in addition to controlling
the fleet operating in the waters under the Sencgalese jurisdiction, seeks mainly to bring
in foreign exchange currency.
!FHE ROLE OF SUBSIDIES
The importance of the fishery in Senegal as a source of food supply for the growing
population, employment, and hard currency are all good reasons for carefully considering
the merits of different management strategies.
However, subsidies, which are arguably the most powerful of all management incen-
tives, merit special and careful consideration, due to their political popularity and stability,
as well as their likely negative cffccts at the biological Icvel.
The heavy concentration of subsidies on production has given fishermen access to
a more efficient technology. The overcapacity in some arcas of the country and the decrease
in the profitability of the artisanal purse seine combined with the inefficient distribution
system of fish in the country suggest that subsidies might bc better used if they were now
directed toward improving the markcting network. The adverse effects of permanent assis-
tance programs generated in both the Ivory Coast and Norwegian cases suggest a
progressive reduction of subsidies as effort in the fishery builds up. Kept on a permanent
basis, financial suppon programs cause overcapacity and resource depletion, and conse-
quently rising costs of harvesting. It is likely that subsidy structures which are not carefully
planned with an objective .of overall scctorial development will have results which are
exactly the opposite of those intcndcd.
As stated earlier, subsidies coupled with the free access to the fishery may cause
serious external effects ranging from the dissipation of the rent to the depletion of the
fish stock when exploitation is occurring beyond maximum sustainable yield. Subsidies
115
can however play an important role in management th the particular case of Senegal if
they are used to expand inshore fisheries by directing effort from the Cup-Vert and Petite
C&e heavily exploited stocks to the lightly exploited fish stocks of the southern Casu-
mnce region. This tool of managing the fishery was implemented with success in Ghana
as reported by LAWSON and ROBINSON (18) where a governmental project proposed
to provide 2 500 outboard motors to fishermen willing to operate only in areas where over-
fishing was not detected. The same strategy was also adopted in Norway as part of a policy
aimed at intensifying the merging of fishery communities in the north of the country. The
apparent low cost of enforcement and the lack of serious equity problems make this approa- ,
ch of managing a small-scale fishcry more feasible than any classical regulatory policy:
CONCLUSION
Fishcrmcn in Scncgal arc already in a position to promote their own group action.
The existing fishermen’s coopcralivc could be expanded to handle basic needs of the
industry ranging from gear and motors to gasohnc and even credit services provided to
artisanal fishermen.
The few semi-industrial scincrs operating in Dakar are dilapidated due to poor mana-
gement and access to capital. A policy of replacement and modernisation of these vessels
could take considerable prcssurc off the heavily cxploitcd Dakar fishing grounds. The new
semi-industrial vessels ‘in complement with a dynamic and modem small-scale fleet could
then direct their activities on the lightly exploited stocks of Casamance. Improvement or
construction of adequate infrastructure such as landing piers, ice plants, cold storage as
well as better road, are needed before any exploitation of these fish resources can begin.
However, all these recommendations involve a substantial amount of directed
subsidies for specific structural changes. As we have seen, blanket subsidy programs with
little attention to fishermen bchavior or political realities can have severe impacts in the
fishery sector.
BIBLIOGWHIE
1
ANDERSON L.G., 1977.- The Economics of fishery management. The John
Hopkins University Press, 214 p.
2
ANONYME, 1989.- Situation actuellc dcs rcssources halieutiques du Senegal.
Dot. Int. Cent. Rcch. Oceanogr. Dakar-Thiaroyc, AoClt 1989, 47 p.
3
BEDDINGTON J., REITIG R., 19X3.- Approaches to ‘the regulation of fishing
effort. FA0 Fish. Tech. Pap. 243, 40 p.
4
BOELY T., CHABANNE J., 1975.- Les poissons pelagiques &tiers au Senegal:
La peche sardinierc a Dakar &at actucl et perspectives.
5
CAMARENA T.L., 19X6.- Lcs principalcs espbces de poissons pelagiques &tiers
au SCnegal: Biologic cl evaluation dcs Rcssourccs. Thcsc de 3”me cycle. Universite
dc Brctagne Occidcnlale, 187 p.
6
CHABOUD C., KEBE M., 19X6.- Lcs aspects sbcio-economiques de la p&he
artisanale maritime au !%negal, mutations technologiques et politiques de deve-
loppement. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Fisheries,
Rimouski IO-15 August 1986. GERMA Editor.
116
7
CHARLES A., 1988.- Fishery Socioeconomics: A survey. L;1-< Economics, Vpl.
64, No. 3, August 1988 : 276-295.
8
DEME M., 1983.- Les exportations ub poissons de !a p&lie a-:isanale senegalaise.
In Dot. Sci. Cent. Rcch. Oceanogr. Dakar. Thiaroye, 85 : l-28.
9
DEME M., 1986.- A bio-economic simulation model for the Senegalese pelagic
fishery. Unpublished Master of Sciences thesis, URI; 108 p.
10 DIAKHATE T., 1984.- Estimation de la valeur ajoutee de la p&he arti.sanale
SCnCgalaise en 1983. Dot. Int. Cent. Rech. Oceanogr. Dakar-Thiaroye, 70, 30 p.
11 EVERETT G.V., ANSA-EMMIN M., ROBINSON M.A., F.C. ROEST, 1982.-
Recent trends in CECAF Fisheries. CECAF/TECH/82/42, 95 p.
12 FAO. Introduction to fishcrics managcmcnt: advantages, difficulties, and
mechanisms. FA0 Fish. Tech. Pap. 224, Rome. 53 p.
13 FAO. Management concepts for small-scale fisheries: economics and social
aspects. FA0 Fish. Tech. Pap. 228, Rome. 51 p.
14 FONTANA A., 1983.- Lcs rcssources en poissons pelagiques cbtiers au Senegal.
Etat des stocks et des pechcrics. Dot. int. Cent. Rech. Oceanogr. Dakar. Thiaroye.
15 FREON P., WEBER J., 1985.- Djiferc au Senegal, la p&he artisanale en mutation
dans un contexte industriel. Rev. trava. Inst. PCches Mariti., 47 (3 et 4): 261-304.
16 FREON P., 1988.- Reponses et adaptations des stocks de clupeides d’Afrique de
I’Ouest 21 la variabilite du milieu et de I’exploitation. Analyse et reflexion a partir
de I’exemple du SCnCgaI. Etudes et Thcscs, ORSTOM, 287 p.
17 JENTOFT S., MIKALSEN, 1987. Govcrnmcnt subsidies in Norwegian fisheries.
’
Regional dcvclopmcnt or political favouritism. Marine Policy, Vol. 11, No. 3,
217-228.
18 LAWSON R., ROBINSON M., 1983.- Artisanal fishcry in West Africa: Problems
of managcmcnt implementation. Marine Policy, Vol. 7, No. 4, October 1983 :
279-290.
19 ROBINSON M., LAWSON R., 1986.- Some rcflcctions on aid to fisheries in West
Africa. Marine Policy, April 1986, 101-110.
20 SAMB B., 1986.- Seasonal growth, mortality and recruitment pattern of Sardineflu
maderensis off Senegal. Contribution to the Tropical Fisheries Biology. FA0
Fish. Report 389 : 257-271.
. .
21 SAMB B., CHAM M., 1988.- Results from the fisheries of purse-seincrs based
in Gambia. Note Cent. Rcch. Occanogr. Dakar-Thiaroye, 18 p.
22 SHOTTON R., 1984.- Preliminary assessment of the Northwest African Small
pelagic fishery. CECAF/INT/81/014.
23 SUTINEN J.C., POLLNAC R., 1979.- Economic, social and cultural aspects of
stock assessment for tropical small-scale fisheries. ICMRD Working Paper, 5, URI.
24 WARREN J., GRIFFIN W., GRANT G., 1982.- Regional fish stock management:
A model for North-West Africa. Marine Policy, Vol. 6, No. 2 : 121-130.
PELAGIC FISHERIES OF SENEGAL : MANAGEMENT OPTIONS,
POLICY CONSTRAINTS AND THE ROLE OF SUBSIDIES *
M. DEME
ISRA researcher
Department of fisheries research
ABSTRACT
After a global presentation of the Senegalese pelagic fishery, the identification as well
as the location and the distribution of the fish stocks, this article analyses the effects of
financial support programs in the industry. The suitability of some classical regulatory
policies to manage small scale fishery of Senegal is discussed and constraints which fishe-
ry managers may be confronted when implementing such measures are identified.
Special consideration is given to subsidies as a management tool for the fishery.
Key words : Fishcrics, Management, Senegal, Small pelagics, Subsidies.
Preparation of this article was supported by the International
l
Center for Ocean Development
(ICOD) while in training in Canada. The paper has benefited from constructive critiques and sug-
gestions from Birane SAMB, Jean-Jacques LEVENEZ. and Moustapha KEBE (CRODT),
Anthony CHARLES (Saint Mary’s University), Helene TREMBLAY and James WILSON (Groupe
d’Etudes des Ressources Maritimes, UQAR), Jon SUTINEN (University of Rhode Islmd, USA).
LES PECHERIES PELAGIQUES DU SENEGAL :
OPTIONS DE GESTION,
CONTRAINTES POLITIQUES ET ROLE DES SUBVENTIONS
M. DEME
Chercheur de LI~RA
Direcrion des Recherches sur les Productions ilalieutiques
RESUME
Après une présentation g6nérale dc la pkhcrie des petits pélagiques côtiers au
SénCgal, ce document analyse les impacts macro-économiques de quelques politiques
sectorielles d’accompagnement dc I’industric. L’application dc certaines techniques
classiques d’aménagement a cette ptkherie est discutk et les contraintes potentielles sont
identifiks. L’assistancc financikrc comme instrument de gestion des pêcheries est
explorée.
Mots-clés : Pkhcries, Aménagement, StWgal, Petits pélagiques côtiers,
Subventions.
105
INTRODUCTION
Senegalese fishery benefits from some exceptional natural factors like a sea rich in
fish, a climate characterized by sub-tropical upwelling conditions and a coastal zone
extending over 700 kilometres.
Fishery is a vital sector in Senegal. It was the second most important activity after
agriculture in the country’s economy. Currently it is becoming predominant due to the
persistent drought hurting the agricultural sector since the late 1970’s. The value of fish
and fish products, estimated at US $ 100 million, exceeded the value of the agricultural
products in both- 1980 and 1981 (11). Fishery is a source of currency which contributes
significantly to the improvement of the balance of payments and to the financing of
public investments. This activity is the primary source of animal protein, urban as well
as rural. The average per capita consumption of fish exceeds 20 kilograms in some areas
of the country. Fishery contrtbutes greatly to employment in the country by providing
jobs to 35 000 fishermen - not including the many people involved in processing,
distribution and retailing, boat building and net making. This massive fisheries base
helps to stabilize rural populations along the coast line. On the whole, fishery comprises
about 10 percent of the Senegalese work force (10).
State authorities having realised the importance of fishery in the Senegalese
economy, instituted several dcvclopmcnt projects As pointed out by many fishery eco-
nomists (24), this development program should be supported by studies of the effects of
such investments on the fish stocks, long-term fish production, national employment,
local income, and foreign cxchangc.
This paper focuses on the pelagic fishery due to its long term importance in Sene-
galese landings and some indications of over exploitation in some areas of the country
due to increasing fishing effort.
After providing a description of the Senegalese pelagic fishery, the identification as
well as the location and the distribution of the fish stocks, effects of financial support
programs in the industry are analysed. The suitability of some classical regulatory
policies to manage small scale fishery of Senegal is discussed and constraints which
fishery managers may be confronted when implementing such measures are identified
Special consideration is given to subsidies as a management tool for fishery.
FISHERY RESOURCES
Major small pelagic fish landed are round sardinella (Sardinelfa aurikz), flat sardinella
(Sardinella maderensis), and bonga (Elhmalosa jimbriata). These three species account
for more than 63 percent of the pelagic catches in 1988 and are characterized by their
high abundance that makes their economic exploitation possible.
Sardinelfa aurila. is found in the cooler water upwelling areas. The species has two
spawning peaks occuring in May-June and September-November (16). The age of first
maturity of Sardinelfa aurifa is on average 18 centimeters (5). The individuals born in
the Senegalcse waters will stay there until they reach a size of 25 centimeters on average
and start their migration cycle which would take them back only during the cold season
(14): As a result, adults are present in the Senegalese waters for no more than 6 months
during the -year.
106
Surdinellu muderensis is found in areas of upwellings and warm waters with low
salinity such as estuaries and river mouths. Reproduction of this species takes place from
April to November, with the period of spawning varying from year to year (20). The age
of first maturity of Surdinellu muderensis is estimated at 16 centimeters (5). Two nursery
areas occur in the Mauritania-Senegalese area coinciding with those of Surdinella uuritu.
Ethmulosu jGnbriutu or bonga occurs in shallow waters, lagoons, estuaries, and near
river mouths. This species is characterized by its coastal distribution. Migration of Ethmczlosu
fimbriutu is very limited compared to Surdinellu uuritu. In Senegal, spawning peaks occur
from March to July, and from October to November (22).
Data collected from acoustic surveys show there to, be a potential of 60 to 70 000
tons of small pelagic fish available in the C&e Nerd of Senegal (2) while FREON (16)
es&mated 110 000 tons of Surdinellu spp in the Petite C&e region in the most favourable
upwelling conditions. Polish seiners catches and results from acoustic surveys indicate a
potential of 80 to 90 000 tons of small pelagic in the Cusumunce area (2) (Pig. 1).
Figure 1 : Fishing regions of Senegal
S E N E G A L
107
HARVESTING SECTOR
Small pelagic fish are subject to both small-scale and semi- industrial exploitation.
Each of these sectors have had its own distinct evolution and impact on the fisheries of
Senegal and on the small pelagic fisheries in particular. These sectors are compared in
several respects below.
ARTISANAL FISHERY
The purse seine is by far the most widely used gear in the small-scale fishery. The
artisanal purse seine unit consists of two outboard powered pirogues, about 14 to 20 meters
in length with a load capacity ranging from 16 to 25 metric tons and a crew size of 20
people on average The net has a length ranging from 300 to 400 meters.
The surrounding gillnct, which is used less intensively in small-scale fishery, is on
average operated by a 7-man crew using a 14 meter motorized canoe. The bigger
meshed nets capture Ethmalosa fimbriafa, while the smaller meshed nets are directed
mainly toward the capture of Sardinella maderensis.
Since being introduced by FA0 in 1972, the number of artisanal purse seines has
increased sharply over the years. The April 1988 CRODT census counted 324 operational
nets along the Senegalese coasts. At the same time 140 surrounding gillnets were coun-
ted. The economic importance of this gear has decreased with the introduction of the
purse seine, which is more productive and more efficient in the fishery.
The total artisanal fishing catch estimated at 231 272 metric tons in 1987 increased
to 236 966 tons in 1988. Pelagic fish accounted for the major part of the catch in both
years totalling about 186 046 and 194 430 metric tons respectively in 1987 and 1988
(tabl. 1).
Fishing trips in artisanal tishcry. last a day, and usually less than ten hours due to
the small carrying capacity and the mode of fish preservation. Small-scale fishery has
experienced an unprecedented increase of its fishing effort in Mbour and Joal, the two
major fishing grounds of the country (tabl. 2).
The catch per unit of effort (CPUE) of artisanal fishing units showed a decrease since
1978 and had remarkably improved in 1988 by reaching its highest level for the last ten
years. In fact, the artisanal purse seine CPUE was 4.06 tons/fishing trip in Joal while the
surrounding gillnet registered 1.80 tons/ fishing trip (tabl. 3).
SEMI-INDUSTRIAL FISHERY
The semi-industrial purse seine fishery operates with vessels up 32 meters in length
with carrying capacities ranging from 13 to 120 tjb and equipped with engines varying
between 110 and 600 horsepower, a power-block and various electronic equipment. Unlike
the artisanal sector, the catches of the semi- industrial fleet are preserved with ice chilled
sea water before being landed ashore for processing.
The number of semi-industrial seiners was limited to one vessel until 1966. A record
of 19 units was reached in both 1974 and 1982. In 1988 only 5 vessels are operating follo-
wing the crisis resulting from poor managcmeht, difficulties of access to formal credit and
the sharp decreases in both landings and prices that the fishery is experiencing.
108
Table no 1 : Total landings of the artisanal fishery (tons)
Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Species
\\
-
-
Pelagic fish
107 940
125 565
120 365
122 065
150984
186046
194 430
Demersal fish
22 835
30 042
36 736
37 880
40 777
34 149
32 576
Shrimps
1279
‘1 184
598
946
1741
2 131*
1 984
Gasteropod
7901
6 372
3 886
5 818
5600
6 846
4 619
Miscellaneous
1951
2 052
1 806
1 559
2 033
2 100
3 357
Total
141 906 165 215
163 391
168 268
201135 231272
236 966
Table no 2 : Fishing trips for artisanal units in Mbour and Joal
MBOUR
JOAL
Year
Purse. Seine
Surrounding
Purse Seine
. Surrounding
Gillnet
Gillnet
1978
5 141
837
2 940
3 371
1979
8 455
260
3 798
7 136
1980
6 283
383
4 316
5 448
1981
8 377
911
5 665
6 650
1982
7 838
817
7 683
9048
1983
10 796
2 933
8 253
11 552
1984
9 702
3 766
9 087
16 215
1985
8 376
4 884
9 505
19 929
1986
11 960
1 595
10 208
17 702
1987
9 375
2 026
10 684
19 569
1988
13 529
1 844
11816
18 117
109
Table no 3 : CPUE for artisanal fishing units in Mbour and Joal (tons)
MBOUR
JOAL
Year
Surrounding
Surrounding
Purse Seine
Gillnet
Purse Seine
Gillnet
___-. --.--
---__--
__--
1978
2.85
I .03
2.72
1.09
1979
2.36
0.78
2.41
1.17
1980
2.33
0.72
2.63
0.74
1981
2.35
0.70
2.85
0.74
1982
2.44
0.78
2.70
0.98
1983
3.18
0.99
2.64
0.99
1984
2.34
0.84
2.14
1.09
1985
3.14
0.83
2.44
1.03
1986
3.70
1.10
2.57
1.21
1987
3.66
1.05
3.82
1.60
1988
3.40
1.11
4.06
1.80
The annual landings of semi-industrial seiners increased from 2 000 tons at the
beginning of the activity (4) to a record of 33 908 tons of fish in 1974. Landings have
decreased since, and in 1988 only 4199 tons were landed.
Fishing effort of the semi-industial fishery increased up to 1982 when it reached
32 720 sea hours and then dccreascd to only 7520 hours in 1988.
Semi-industrial Ilcct catch per unit of effort, very high at the beginning of the fishery
(15 tons/l0 hours), has dccrcascd remarkably and is oscillating around only 6 tons in 1988.
This seems to bc the result of the concentrated effort of semi-industrial and artisanal
seiners confined on the fishing grounds near Dakar, which are heavily exploited. Also the
semi-industrial vcsscls which arc very old and poorly managed are suffering from compe-
tition of artisanal units which have lower operating costs and special financial assistance
from the state authorities. These two factors enable artisanal vessels to sell their catch
at a lower price.
Table 4 summarises the historical data of -semi-industrial fishery.
There must added 4 Gambian sciners which have caught 5 539 tons of fish in the
Sencgambian waters bctwccn Novcmbcr 1987 and the end of 1988, accounting for 85
fishing trips (21).
Ships operated by AFRICAN SEA FOOD are not considered in this paper, since they
started their activities in 1989 only.
110
Table no 4 : Evolution of the semi-industrial fishery
Year
Number
Landings (Tons) Fi~~~~o~s~t
CPUE
(Tons/l0 Hours)
1978
10
20 507
1 777
12
1979
15
25 025
2 215
11
1980
18
27 508
2 634
10
1981
15
31 362
2 900
11
1982
19
24 884
3 272
8
1983
17
17 981
3 065
6
1984
13
6 990
1478
5
1985
9
5 982
1 086
6
1986
5
3 145
684
5
1987
5
4 805
662
7
1988
5
4 199
752
6
FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROGRAMS AND FISHERY SUBSIDIES
The Senegalcsc government, rcalizing the importance of fishery as a major source
of animal protein, income, and employment, instituted several development projects. The
most important are the motorisation of pirogues and the introduction of the purse seine
gear in the small-scale fishcry. These two major projects benefit from financial support
programs. Outboard motors, fishing gear, and spare parts are sold to fishermen duty and
tax free, and gasoline includes a subsidy clement which is about 51 percent of the total
price. These financial support programs have without doubt contributed to the deve-
lopment of small-scale pelagic fishcry just as they have also gcncratcd adverse effects in
the industry.
POSITIVJX IMPACTS OF CURRENT POLICY
Financial support programs have contributed to the profitability of the Scnegalesc pelagic
fishcry by providing a less costly fishing method to the small-scale fishermen exploiting
the pelagic fish stocks. As a result, production has increased remarkably following Ihe
extensive expansion of fishcry. The unprccedcntcd incrcasc in landings led to the rapid
development of both local and export fresh fish markets and the artisanal fish smoking
industry. The creation of new jobs, the stabilization of rural populations along the coastline
and the improvcmcnt of the quality of the fish landed arc other successes linked to the
assistance programs for the small-scale fishcry. With the wide adoption of outboard motors,
111
motorization is “likely remaining a permanent feature of the artisanal fishery of Senegal”
(19). However, the decrease in the profitability of the artisanal purse seine which is ap-
parently related to overfishing resulting from excess fishing effort, especially in the Petite
C6te region, seems to indicate that assistance programs have passed their limits.
PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION
Export-Orientation
One of the major objectives of the state authorities, by providing assistance to small-
scale fishermen, is to improve the nutritional standard of the Senegalese population
through a sufficicnt’supply of fish in the home market at a fair price. However, the small-
scale fishcry is presently an industry well intcgratcd into the economic activity of the country
and contributes more than 40 pcrccnt of the supply of the processing plants for exports
in 1981 (8). The orientation of the artisanal fishery towards the foreign markets coupled
with the available export subsidies (15 percent of the FOB value of exports) make one
wonder who benefits most from the financial assistance to the fishery, outside of local
processors and the foreign consumers. As an illustration, in 1981 the subsidy per kilogram
of fish landed at Djifere, cstimatcd at 22 FCFA trebled the price paid to fishermen by
the processing company Sopcsinc.
Trough 1982, this company converted, on a yearly basis, nearly 20 000 tons of
sardinellas and bongas to fish meal for the international market Cl5, 6) while at the same
time there is a severe shortage of animal protein in most rural areas of the Senegal.
Poor Distribution and Marketing
Financial assistance to fishery is mainly concentrated on production leading to an
increased harvesting capacity of fishcrmcn, but the existing market distortions and their
costs arc often neglected. The incfficicnt distribution system of fish in Senegal is partially
caused by the precarious transportation facilities of fish traders and the insufficiency. of
fish marketing infrastructure facilities in the main markets and landing sites. The inadequate
transportation syslcm coupled with the long distances involved lead to high marketing
costs, due principally to fuel and refrigeration costs. Part of these costs are then passed
on by middlemen as increases in consumer prices. As an illustration, in 1985 fishermen
received on average 29 F CFA per kilogram of sardineila in the Petile C&e. This fish
was then sold for 300 FCFA at Tambacounda, some few hundred kilometers away from
the coast.
This is not to argue that subsidies and direct fiscal inccntivcs for fishermen should
cease but rather that some subsidies could bc redirected in order to improve the marketing
and distribution network, and thereby increase the welfare of fishermen and domestic
consumers. As the fishery has undergone a rapid growth since the introduction of the purse
seine and the motorization of canoes, an improvement in the efficiency of marketing
should be given priority in any development plan. Refrigerated trucks and cold storage
facilities could be sold to fish traders through a governmental tax exemption program.
Excess Fishing Effort
Subsidies and tax exemption contribute to decrease the cost of fishing. In turn, lower
costs bring mom effort into fishcry. The excess effort could push the fish population
I12
down to such an extent that sustainable yield would fall, as would the revenues of fishermen
due to the decrease in sustainable yield (assuming a constant price). Any profit produced
by lower costs encourages further entry in theopen-access fishery until that profit is dissipated’.
Depending upon the ratio of price to cost, a decrease in cost offered by financial support
programs will not help fishermen under open-access conditions in the long run. In fact,
it may lead to a decrease in catch due to excessive effort from existing boats expanding
their fishing capacity and from new fishing units entering the industry attracted by the
short-run profits provided by the financial assistance programs. For example, in the Ivory
Coast,.as reported by LAWSON and ROBINSON (18), fishery underwent an unprece-
dented expansion following the introduction of a soft loan scheme in 1980, leading to the
proliferation of the purse seine gears. The high resulting pressure put on the fishery resulted
quickly in a decrease of both catch rates and fishermen’s incomes. Defaults on loans and
the potential extinction of the fish stock pushed fishermen, fishing department authorities
and the lending banks to agree to close the fishery temporarily. As a further example,
the policy of industrialisation in Norway through state subsidies as pointed out by
JENTOFF and MIKALSEN (17) “did more IO produce overcupaciry and resource depletion
than to generate profitability and efficiency”.
CLASSICAL MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND SMALL PELAGIC FISHERIES
The level of catches in the Petite c6te in 1986 was higher than the potential which
is estimated at 110 000 tons.. And in 1987 and 1988 landings have increased again. Given
the structure of Senegal’s small pelagic fishcry, as discussed above, and indications that
the existing and generally increasing fishing effort has caused biological as well as econo-
mica1 overfishing in some arcas of the country, what rclcvance do classical management
approaches have for this fishery. Should managemcm policies accompany the deve-
lopment program in the open-access fishcry, in order to realise the added profit ? Are
classical regulatory policies applicable to the small-scale fishery ?
As pointed out by many fishcry cconomists(7, 23) the choice among ‘alternative
management policies should be based on a set of criteria which includes: acceptance and
support of the majority of fishermen conccrncd, flexibility, full accounting of the involved
costs, wealth distribution, and employment implications. This chapter discusses the suita-
bility of some of the classical measures to manage the small pelagic lishery of Senegal.
QUOTAS
With a global quota the regulatory agency decides on the total amount of fish to be
caught during a given period and closes down the fishery when that amount is reached.
A quota system has a positive cffcct on the conservation of the fish stock through
direct control of the fishing mortality. No equity considerations arc present because of
’ It is not the purpose of this paper to argue the important efficiency implications of rent dissipation.
We are merely pointing out that if it is the objective of the public to retain resource rents in the
public domain or in the hands of a limited number of fishermen. then this policy will not achieve
that objective.
113
the absence of direct allocation. Enforcement costs are relatively low and it is easy to
monitor the fishery once it is closed. There is no incentive for fishermen to fill the global
quota with the most valuable species, reducing the risk to extinction as may be the case
in a multispecies fishery because small pclagics are close substitutes and low value fish,
and each gear directs its effort mainly to a specific species. However, due to the nature
of the Senegalese small-scale fishery a quota system would be impractical. Fishing units
numbering in the hundreds are highly mobile and widely distributed over 700 kilometers
of coastlines and often in remote and highly inaccessible areas.
Monitoring catches would be too costly and technically impossible if individual
quotas were implemented. In addition to the allocation problem that may emerge, the regula-
tory agency may face two mutually exclusive objectives consisting of encouraging
efficiency in the fishery and keeping in the industry the poor fishermen *ho have no
means to compete for quotas in the market (12, 13).
GEAR RESTRICTIONS
The best known and most widely used gear restriction is the adjustment of the mesh
size of the different active gears in the fishery. This type of regulation prevents the
destruction of the fishery by maintaining a productive age structure of the stock. Young
fish allowed to grow larger can reproduce and hence contribute to the biomass of the
fish stock before being caught.
This management policy is already implemented in the Senegalese pelagic fishery.
Its non-distributional form of regulation makes it politically and socially acceptable.
Enforcement costs can be very low when meshes are standardixed. The economic perfor-
mance of this type of regulation is howcvcr suboptimal because resulting increases in
stocks gcncratc bcttcr short-term catches and more profit to fishermen, thus attracting
new fishing units in the industry until dissipation of the generated rent results. As ob-
served in Scncgal, fishcrmcn in the long run easily by-pass such restrictions by re-
placing the nets with larger ones during the repair and maintenance process. Gear res-
trictions, as dcmonstratcd by many fishery economists, raise the average cost of fishing
and leave the open-access problem unsolved.
TAXATION
This regulatory policy aims to control fishing effort by taking away the rent which
motivates fishermen to over-invest in fishing equipment or attracts new fishing units in
the industry. The capability of taxes to conscrvc the fish stock is high since the management
authority can influence effort or the amount of fish landed.
Furthermore, taxes can bc used to channel fishing effort towards the less heavily
fished stocks. However, as already mentioned, the nature of the Senegalese fishery (mobile
fishing units, multi-species, hetcrogcncity of gears, over 125 landing sites) makes moni-
toring and enforcing taxing regulation very expensive. In most developing countries like
Senegal, taxing artisanal fishermen, who are among the least favoured in the community.
and who barely earn subsistence incomes is politically and socially infeasible. As men-
tioned by BEDDINGTON and RETTIG(3) taxes would have to rise if they are to reduce
effort as stocks decline. However, for political and social reasons, it would be quite difficult
to increase artisanal fishermen’s taxes at exactly the same time that their expected catch
114
has been reduced. Unlike the artisanal fishery, the semi-industrial fishermen are subject
to payment of port taxes and landing charges. However, this taxation scheme does not
attempt to control fishing effort but is only a way to increase state revenues,
LICENSING
This regulation restricts directly the number of units operating in the fishery, resulting
in a probable improvement of both the yield and economic performance of the fishery.
But how is one to distribute the licences ? If auctioned or sold in the market, most artisanal
fishermen, who barely earn a subsistence income and who have no access to formal credit,
would be driven out of the fishery. The lack of ahcrnalivc employment outside the fishery
makes exiting from the fishery very difficult. Some political and social constraints are then
present when implementing any licensing scheme involving the withdrawal of .some
fishermen from the industry when other sectors of the economy are suffering from chronic
unemployment. In the worst cast licences can bc granted to fishermen who are already
in the fishery for some equity considerations, This would remove the open-access nature
of the fishery but would not reduce the amount of effort deployed on the fish stocks.
ANDERSON (1) proposes to make each license non-transferable and to retract it as the
holder retires or dies until the proper number remains outstanding. But do small-scale
fishermen actually retire? Is it socially fcasiblc to retract a license from a fishing- dependant
household after the head member holder of the fishing license dies (9) ?
At present, industrial fishermen arc licensed. This policy in addition to controlling
the fleet operating in the waters under the Sencgalese jurisdiction, seeks mainly to bring
in foreign exchange currency.
!FHE ROLE OF SUBSIDIES
The importance of the fishery in Senegal as a source of food supply for the growing
population, employment, and hard currency are all good reasons for carefully considering
the merits of different management strategies.
However, subsidies, which are arguably the most powerful of all management incen-
tives, merit special and careful consideration, due to their political popularity and stability,
as well as their likely negative cffccts at the biological Icvel.
The heavy concentration of subsidies on production has given fishermen access to
a more efficient technology. The overcapacity in some arcas of the country and the decrease
in the profitability of the artisanal purse seine combined with the inefficient distribution
system of fish in the country suggest that subsidies might bc better used if they were now
directed toward improving the markcting network. The adverse effects of permanent assis-
tance programs generated in both the Ivory Coast and Norwegian cases suggest a
progressive reduction of subsidies as effort in the fishery builds up. Kept on a permanent
basis, financial suppon programs cause overcapacity and resource depletion, and conse-
quently rising costs of harvesting. It is likely that subsidy structures which are not carefully
planned with an objective .of overall scctorial development will have results which are
exactly the opposite of those intcndcd.
As stated earlier, subsidies coupled with the free access to the fishery may cause
serious external effects ranging from the dissipation of the rent to the depletion of the
fish stock when exploitation is occurring beyond maximum sustainable yield. Subsidies
115
can however play an important role in management th the particular case of Senegal if
they are used to expand inshore fisheries by directing effort from the Cup-Vert and Petite
C&e heavily exploited stocks to the lightly exploited fish stocks of the southern Casu-
mnce region. This tool of managing the fishery was implemented with success in Ghana
as reported by LAWSON and ROBINSON (18) where a governmental project proposed
to provide 2 500 outboard motors to fishermen willing to operate only in areas where over-
fishing was not detected. The same strategy was also adopted in Norway as part of a policy
aimed at intensifying the merging of fishery communities in the north of the country. The
apparent low cost of enforcement and the lack of serious equity problems make this approa- ,
ch of managing a small-scale fishcry more feasible than any classical regulatory policy:
CONCLUSION
Fishcrmcn in Scncgal arc already in a position to promote their own group action.
The existing fishermen’s coopcralivc could be expanded to handle basic needs of the
industry ranging from gear and motors to gasohnc and even credit services provided to
artisanal fishermen.
The few semi-industrial scincrs operating in Dakar are dilapidated due to poor mana-
gement and access to capital. A policy of replacement and modernisation of these vessels
could take considerable prcssurc off the heavily cxploitcd Dakar fishing grounds. The new
semi-industrial vessels ‘in complement with a dynamic and modem small-scale fleet could
then direct their activities on the lightly exploited stocks of Casamance. Improvement or
construction of adequate infrastructure such as landing piers, ice plants, cold storage as
well as better road, are needed before any exploitation of these fish resources can begin.
However, all these recommendations involve a substantial amount of directed
subsidies for specific structural changes. As we have seen, blanket subsidy programs with
little attention to fishermen bchavior or political realities can have severe impacts in the
fishery sector.
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